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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the relationship between probabilistic and symbolic ap- 
proaches to reasoning under uncertainty. The principal result is that symbolic and 
quantitative approaches interact in interesting, sometimes counterintuitive ways. 
There are several reasons for  believing that over multiple domains and applica- 
tions, propositions true in most (few) of  the possible states enumerated by a 
symbolic reasoning system will usually (rarely) be true. This result does not 
necessarily depend on the "'true" probability of  the possible states. Regarding 
attempts to merge symbolic and probabilistic procedures, it is shown that this is a 
fundamentally difficult problem. An automated system that assigns probabilities 
after a possibility space has been specked will either promote inappropriate 
probability estimates or perform redundant processing. Alternatively, one could 
use an approach that combines probabilities with possibility ratios to generate 
belief values that are guaranteed to satisfy certain calibration properties, but this 
generally requires ignoring some "'known'" probabilities. 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of proper procedures for automated reasoning under 
uncertainty is a major research issue in the artificial intelligence (AI) commu- 
nity. Most approaches to this issue fall into one of two major groups: 
quantitative theories that emphasize the use of various uncertainty calculi (see 
Pear l  [1] for review), and symbolic/qualitative theories that emphasize the use 
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of a categorical system for "jumping to conclusions" (for review see Reiter 
[2]). 
Symbolic reasoning systems can often be characterized as systems for 
dynamically enumerating (often implicitly), revising, and reasoning about sets 
of "possible states." In a propositional language (first order system with finite 
language) a state can be defined as a set of sentences from which every 
sentence in the language or its negation can be derived. Domain axioms that 
describe known relations between sentences in the language serve to reduce the 
set of states considered possible. When dealing with uncertainty or incomplete 
information default logics (Reiter [3]), circumscription schemas (McCarthy 
[4]), model preference theories (Shoham [5]), and other nonmonotonic exten- 
sions to first-order logic operate by selectively reducing the set of possible 
states. Alternatively some systems operate by actively constructing possible 
states. For instance, explanation-based l arning systems (Ellman [6]) generate 
from generalizations drawn from past experience possible scenarios that can 
explain a current situation and predict future events. Assumption-based truth 
maintenance systems (deKleer [7]) keep track of alternative assumption sets 
and the conclusions justified by each set. In all these systems, a sentence is 
considered true (possible) iff it is contained in all (some) of the possible states. 
In contrast to the symbolic approaches, uncertainty calculi (e.g., Pearl [1], 
Shafer [8], Zadeh [9]) deal with fixed sets of possible states over which 
distributions of belief values are assigned and adjusted in the light of new 
evidence. 
In recent years, interest has focused on developing systems that combine 
quantitative and symbolic approaches (e.g., Laskey and Lehner [10], deKleer 
and Williams [11], Nilson [12]), as well as on understanding the relationship 
between these two forms of reasoning (Pearl [1], Halpern [13], Bacchus [14]). 
Unfortunately, many fundamental questions remain unanswered. This makes it 
difficult to assess the usefulness of approaches that merge the two forms of 
reasoning. 
For instance, is it reasonable to treat a proposition as "probably true" if it's 
contained in most of the possible states? In its early development, this question 
was often brought up by symbolic theorists (e.g., McDermott [15], p. 53), but 
has since been dropped unanswered. Intuitively the answer is "yes ,"  although 
formally there is no necessary connection between the ratio of possible states 
and probability. A "yes"  answer would make it possible to derive graded 
belief values from a purely symbolic system. However, it would also make 
attempts to merge qualitative and symbolic approaches confusing, since there 
would be two interrelated sources of quantitative evidence for a hypothesis--its 
quantitative belief value and its possibility ratio. 
In this paper, some fundamental spects of the relationship between proba- 
bility and symbolic reasoning approaches are explored. The objective of this 
paper is not  to develop yet another uncertainty calculus, but to contribute to 
our understanding of the domain of reasoning under uncertainty. 
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POSSIBILITY RATIOS: FORMAL PROPERTIES 
One way of evaluating alternative approaches to reasoning under uncertainty 
is to identify a set properties that an inference system should have and then to 
assess (empirically or analytically) the extent o which each approach satisfies 
three properties. Although various such properties have been proposed, three 
that seem common are coherence, calibration, and audaciousness (e.g., Hor- 
wich [16]). Loosely described, coherence refers to the extent o which belief 
values are internally consistent, calibration the extent to which belief values 
reflect reality (i.e., most propositions with high [low] belief are true [false]); 
and audaciousness the extent o which the system assigns extreme belief values 
(i.e., high and low vs. moderate belief values). In this section, the simplistic 
possible states ratio approach is evaluated in terms of these criteria. 
In the definitions and theorems that follow, the term "propositional system" 
is used to mean a propositional language and axioms that characterize a finite 
set of possible states. In the propositional system, logically equivalent proposi- 
tions are contained in exactly the same set of possible states. This applies even 
to cases where the possible states represent models of a first-order data base, or 
if the states include nonstandard sentences, uch as counterfactual implications 
(Hunter [17]) or modal belief operators (e.g., Fagin and Halpern [18]). 
Calibration 
Clearly, a desirable feature of any system that assigns belief values is that 
the assignments reflect reality. That is, we should feel justified in believing that 
a relatively high (low) percentage of the statements a signed a high (low) belief 
value are true. Indeed, if this is not the case then it is not clear how one could 
reliably use such a system to make decisions. 
DEFINrrION Precise calibration. Given a propositional system, a set of 
belief values are precisely calibrated iff for all belief values, x, the proportion 
of truths in the set of logically distinct propositions with belief value x is x. 
Given a set of possible states that contains the true state, one can derive 
belief value statements hat are precisely calibrated. To show this, consider the 
confirmation function, c. Let p and q be any propositions defined in a 
propositional system PP. Let N(p, PP) be the number of possible worlds in 
the propositional system PP containing p. We define (after Carnap [18]): 
N(p&q,  PP) 
c (p lq )= N(q lpp  ) 
c assigns relative belief values to propositions in accordance with the propor- 
tion of states containing those propositions. If q is a tautology, then c (p  I q) 
= c(p) ,  and are referred to as conditional and unconditional values. 
The c-function makes no reference to external probability or frequency 
information. Despite this, the c-function satisfies the following property. 
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THEOREM 1 I f  the true state is a member of  the set of  possible states, 
then the unconditional values assigned by the c-function are precisely 
calibrated. 
Proof All proofs are in the Appendix. 
Theorem 1 tells us that the c-function is precisely calibrated no matter which 
of the possible states is true. Consequently, the c-function is provably, 
precisely calibrated. 
To illustrate why this is true consider a propositional system with two 
propositions { A, B} and one axiom { A ~ B}. There are three possible states 
{ A, B}, { - A, B}, and { - A, - B}. Select a belief value, say 2/3. There 
are three propositions with a c-value of 2/3 {B, - A,  (A &B)  v ( -  A & - 
B)}. Of this set, exactly two are contained in each of the three possible states. 
Audaciousness 
Another useful criterion for evaluating a belief function is the extent to 
which the function tends toward extreme belief values. Other things being 
equal, we would certainly prefer a belief function that assigns high or low, 
rather than intermediate, values. More formally, we say that a function f l is 
uniformly more audacious than f2  iff f l (q ) :~f2(q)  for some q, and 
f l (q )  ___ f2 (q )  whenever f2 (q )  _< .5, and f l (q )  _ f2 (q )  whenever f2 (q )  
_ 5. I Certainly, if f l  and f2  are precisely calibrated, and f l  is uniformly 
more audacious than f2 ,  then f 1 is the preferred function for assigning belief 
values. 
THEOREM 2 A function that assigns rational-numbered belief values 
that are provably, precisely calibrated cannot be uniformly more auda- 
cious than the c-function. 
In other words, if precise calibration is desired, one cannot build a system 
uniformly better than the c-function. 
Coherence 
In the probability/Bayesian pproach to inference under uncertainty (e.g., 
Cheeseman [19]), it is generally agreed that an ideally rational agent should 
maintain coherent beliefs; that is, belief values that conform to the probability 
calculus. This is because incoherent belief values have a number of undesirable 
properties (e.g., Savage [20], Lindley [21], de Finetti [22]). 
THEOREM 3 The c-function is the only function that assigns provably, 
precisely calibrated belief values that are coherent. 
I Note audaciousness i  defined in terms of a scale ranging from 0 to 1 where .5 means 
"uncertain." This presupposes something like a probability. The results here may not apply to 
systems that use other scales (e.g., belief unctions). 
Probabilities and Reasoning About Possibilities 31 
According to Theorem 3, if we want a system that is both coherent and 
guaranteed to be precisely calibrated, then the only acceptable function is one 
that assigns belief values in terms of ratios of possible states. 
Summary 
Using criteria commonly used to evaluate uncertainty calculi, we find that a 
simplistic possibility ratio approach fares surprisingly well. To the extent hat 
we insist on both coherence and calibration, we find ourselves necessarily 
drawn to the nonintuitive result that it is counterproductive to use an uncer- 
tainty calculus to derive belief values--use possibility ratios instead. In the 
next section we explore this nonintuitive result more thoroughly. 
POSSIBILITY RATIOS: RELATIVE FREQUENCY PROPERTIES 
The reason that the results of the previous section appear counterintuitive 
has to do largely with how one selects "important propositions." The results 
of the previous section apply globally to the set of all logically distinct 
propositions. One cannot ake a single proposition and assert hat the associated 
belief value is calibrated. In many applications, however, we are interested 
only in a very small set of hypotheses. The only judgments we want to be 
audacious and calibrated are those dealing with these important propositions; 
calibration results for unimportant propositions are irrelevant. 
A Relative Frequency Property 
There are many applications where one cannot distinguish, a priori, impor- 
tant from unimportant propositions. Consider the following context. We have 
been given the responsibility of implementing an inference system that must 
support the needs of several decision systems. Specifically, each decision 
system will submit queries as to the status of certain propositions. The 
inference system reports a belief value for each proposition queried. The 
decision systems, in turn, are addressing a sequence of relatively novel 
problems where the system must generate options rather than select from a 
predeflned option set (e.g., a planning system). In this type of situation, it is 
difficult to predict he propositions that will be queried. That is, the frequency 
distribution of logically distinct propositions queried is relatively flat. 
Assume that the distribution is flat. If the reported belief values are derived 
from the c-function, then it follows that the expected proportion of true 
propositions reported with belief value x is x. Of course, this result is 
conditional on mai-.taining the true state in the set of possible states, which 
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suggests a need to simultaneously maintain many possible states (such as is 
done in an ATMS). 
Updating 
The process of generating possible states is not arbitrary. Consider, for 
instance, explanation-based l arning (Ellman [6]). The idea here is that when- 
ever an event is observed, a learning system can use its "background knowl- 
edge" to construct an explanation (generalization) of the circumstances that led 
to the event. In future problems, when one believes a similar event might 
occur, one retrieves from memory relevant potential explanations to determine 
if the present circumstances match these explanations. 
An interesting consequence of this learning process is that the possible state 
ratio for the events being predicted can track with the belief values that would 
result from updates in a coherent probability model. To illustrate, consider 
Laplace's rule of induction. This rule states that in a series of observations of 
some event A or - A,  after observing n occurrences of A and no instances 
of -A ,  the inductive probability that A will occur on the next trial is 
1 + n/2 + n. This rule is a special case of Carnap's c* function, which is one 
of a family of coherent update functions (Carnap [18]). Now consider a truth 
table containing the 16 possible states for four propositions: A, B, C, and D. 
The proposition of interest is A. The other propositions are considered 
candidates for a deterministic causal model for A. Initially no causal connec- 
tions are posited. Consequently, the c(A)  = .5. After one observation of A 
we posit the causal rule B ~ A. Now c(A)  = 2/3. After A occurs again, we 
add C ~ B. Now c(A) = 3/4. After a third occurrence add D ~ C. Now 
c( A)  = 4/5. Continuing this process we see that c( A)  = 1 + n/2 + n. 
As this example illustrates, if a symbolic reasoning system adds rules to 
explain/predict lasses of events that have occurred, then the ratio of states 
containing those events will tend to increase. One would expect a positive 
correlation between the relative frequency of an event and its possibility ratio. 
How far can we take this example? As it turns out, the following theorem 
holds. 
THEOREM 4 Assume a set of  rational-numbered belief values defined on 
a propositional system PP. The belief values are coherent iff there exists an 
expanded propositional system, EPP, containing PP, such that bel(r I q) 
= c(r I q) for  all r and q in PP. 
Accordance to Theorem 4, one 
specify a symbolic model where 
values of the uncertainty model. 
equally expressive in quantifying 
has a coherent probability model iff one can 
the possible state ratios replicate the belief 
Probability and possible state models are 
belief values. Furthermore, it suggests that 
causal learning systems can be implemented that are consistent with the 
principle of coherent updating (i.e., Bayes rule). 
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Summary 
Possibility ratios do have some relative frequency problems. For inference 
domains where the selection of "important propositions" varies uniformly 
over logically distinct propositions, one anticipates more true propositions 
among the set reported with high belief values. Except for the requirement that 
the true state is included, this relative frequency property does not depend on 
how the possible states are selected. In addition, the process of generating or 
selecting possible states will reflect historical frequencies. So one would 
expect, in general, that there will be some correspondence b tween possible 
state ratios and the belief values reported for important propositions. 
COMBINING SYMBOLIC AND PROBABILISTIC APPROACHES 
Combining Probabilities and Possibility Ratios 
A common objection to the Bayesian desire for full (i.e., point-valued) 
probability models is that people often have more confidence in some probabil- 
ity judgments than others. One response to this objection is to allow the 
specification of higher-order probabilities and then to collapse these into 
point-values. Alternatively, one can use a partial (e.g., interval) model which 
can then be processed as is (e.g., Kyburg [23]) or collapse the partial model 
into point-values through some types of central tendency calculation (Hunter 
[24]). 
Another approach is to interpret an expression of "high confidence" in a 
probability judgment as an assertion of calibration. To express high confidence 
in the judgment "P(a) = .6" is to assert hat "P(a) = .6" is among the high 
confidence set, and that over multiple problems judgments within this set are 
calibrated--the expected proportion of truths in the set of propositions with 
probability .6 is around .6. Similarly if one asserts with high confidence 
".3 < P(a) < .7," then the proportion of truths in the corresponding set is 
between .3 and .7. 
Based on this interpretation, we can treat a partial probability model as a set 
of calibrated belief values. Similarly, the c-function can always be used to 
derive calibrated point values. This leads to the suspicion that it is possible to 
derive calibrated, point-valued beliefs that are consistent with a partial proba- 
bility model. This issue is examined below. 
To study this issue, we begin with the following definition. 
DEFINITION Expected Calibration. A set of belief values satisfy expected 
calibration in a propositional system iff for all belief values x, the expected 
proportion of truths in the set of logically distinct propositions with belief value 
x i s  x. 
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A set of belief values are said to be provably calibrated if it can be 
logically deduced that they satisfy expected calibration. 
Suppose we have a propositional system (PP) and a set of probability 
statements (PR), defined on PP, that are accepted as calibrated. To state that 
the belief values assigned by a belief function (bel) are provably calibrated is 
equivalent to stating that we can prove that for any set Q = {q[ bel(q) = x} 
= { ql . . . . .  qn}, the equation 
P(ql)  + "'" +P(qn) 
=X 
n 
is satisfied no matter what values are assigned to P(q l ) , . . . ,  P(qn) subject 
only to the constraint that these values are consistent with PR. 
Based on the calibration interpretation of a partial probability model, we can 
assume that for each proposition the probability constraints in a model satisfy 
expected calibration. This contrasts with the c-function which satisfies precise 
calibration for each problem, but not for individual propositions. From this it 
is easy to show that both types of values are provably calibrated. 
It is also easy to show instances where both types of information can be 
combined to derive provably-calibrated point-values. To illustrate, consider 
Table 1. There are four possible states with their corresponding c-values 
shown in the second column. Suppose we also assert hat p(a) = .8. Define a 
new function, cp, that assigns a "weight" to subsets of possible states in a 
manner consistent with given probability values, but otherwise assigns equal 
weights. That is 
cp(q) = p(s l )c (q l s l )  + ".. +p(s , )c (q l s , ) ,  
where w~ . . . . .  w, are a set of propositions that partition the possible states 
and for which PR assigns point probability values. The third column in Table 
1 shows the cp-derived values with p(a) = .8. 
The cp-values in the third column are provably calibrated. To see this 
consider the two propositions with belief value .9, aVb and aV - b. From 
just "P (a )  = .8," we can derive 
p(aVb) + P(aV - b) 
P(a) + P (b  I - a )P ( -  a) + P(a)  + P ( -  b I - a )P ( -  a) 
~ ,9  
2 
so these belief values are provably calculated. 
Unfortunately, it is not always the case that one can find provably calibrated 
belief values consistent with PR. Suppose we let PR = {P(a)  = .8, P(b) = 
.6}. For any assignment of point-values to the possible states, consistent with 
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Table 1. Some Possible Belief Values Using the c and cp Functions 
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If use P(s) = .8, 
If no probability If use only P(b)  = .6 and as- 
Propo- information used P(a) sume independence 
s i t ion cp(  ) = c(  ) = cp(  ) = cp(  ) = 
T 1.0 1.0 1.0 
a vb .75 .9 .92 
a v - b .75 .9 .88 
- a vb .75 .6 .68 
- a v -  b .75 .6 .52 
a .5 .8 .8 
b .5 .5 .6 
a&bv - a& - b .5 .5 .56 
a& - bv -  a&b .5 .5 .44 
- b .5 .5 .4 
- a .5 .2 .2 
a & b .25 .4 .48 
a& - b .25 .4 .32 
- a&b .25 .1 .12 
-a&-b  .25 .1 .08 
F 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PR,  one can find an alternative set of PR-consistent values for which the 
assigned values are not calibrated. For instance, column four of Table 1 
assigns cp values under the assumption that a and b are independent. 
However, they may not be independent. Suppose P(a l  b) = 1.0; then P ( -  a 
& b) = 0, which differs from cp( -  a & b)  = . 12. Since - a & b is the only 
proposition with this cp-value, the cp values in column four cannot be 
provably calibrated. On the other hand, from P(a) = .8 we can still prove that 
the cp-values in the third column are calibrated, even though cp(b) = .5 and 
P(b)  = .6. 
Expanding this example a bit further, suppose rather than P(b)  = .6, we 
knew only P(b)  > .45. Now P(b)  = .5 is a possible value. So the values in 
the third column are both consistent with PR and provably calibrated. 
The natural generalization of  this example is the following theorems. 
THBOI~M 5 I f  a set o f  possible states contains the true state, and a set 
o f  probability statements assigns point probabilities to mutually exclusive 
propositions, then the corresponding cp-function assigns provably cali- 
brated values. 
According to Theorem 5, a sufficient condition for being able to derive 
belief values that are PR-consistent and provably calibrated is if PR is a 
complete probabil ity model on a mutually exclusive set of propositions. 
Theorem 6 states necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Tn~o~u 6 I f  a set o f  possible states contains the true state, then there 
36 Paul E. Lehner 
exist provably calibrated and coherent point-values consistent with a set of 
probability statement PR, iff." (1) a subset of PR assigns point probabilities 
to a mutually exclusive set of propositions, and (2) the corresponding 
cp-values are consistent with PR. 
Taken together, these last two theorems suggest an interesting result. 
According to Theorem 6, there will be instances where there is no set of 
values, consistent with a set of calibrated probability statements, for which one 
can guarantee (i.e., prove) calibration. However, an implication of Theorem 5 
is that one can always find provably calibrated values by: (1) selecting a subset 
of PR that defines a complete probability model on logically distinct proposi- 
tions in PP, and (2) ignoring all other probability statements in PR. 
Finally, we note the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 7 There is at most one set of provably calibrated point 
values consistent with a partial probability model. 
Summarizing this section, we arrive at the following counterintuitive r sult. 
An agent can always maintain a set of belief values that are guaranteed to be 
calibrated, but only if that agent is sometimes willing to maintain belief values 
that are inconsistent with values that agent knows to be calibrated. 
Using Possible States to Guide Probability Estimation 
A number of researchers have proposed knowledge representation and 
inference schemes that merge symbolic/default reasoning with probabilistic 
reasoning (e.g., Michalski and Winston [25], Neufield and Poole [26], Breese 
and Tse [27], Hanks [28], and Laskey and Lehner [10]). Typically, these 
systems promote the use of probability information to determine the relative 
merits of alternative possibilities generated via symbolic processing. Although 
it seems inevitable that something along these lines is needed, any attempt to 
merge symbolic and probabilistic reasoning in this way has a fundamental 
limit. 
To illustrate this limit, consider the following example. Assume we have a 
problem where a sensor is being used to detect an object. I f  the sensor is 
working, then it works perfectly--it reports correctly whether or not the object 
exists. After extensive testing, it is also known that the sensor works 80% of 
the time. Define r, s, and o as follows: 
r: "report from sensor that object exists," 
s: "the sensor is working," 
o: "the object exists." 
We also know assumptions that r & s ~ o and - r & s ~ - o. 
Suppose we learn r. Our propositional gives us three possible states: 
{ r , s ,o} ,  { r , - s ,o} ,  and {r , - s , -o} .  We now want to assess the 
probability of o. I f  we use the information p(s) = .8 and apply it to this set of 
states, we quickly conclude p(o) >_ .8. 
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Unfortunately, this is an inappropriate conclusion. The fact that we enumer- 
ated the possible states and then applied probability information led us astray. 
The " t rue"  value of  p(o) could be anywhere from 0 to 1. Suppose, for 
instance, that the base rate prior for o is .01, the probability that the sensor is 
working is independent of o, and that when not working the sensor reports r 
and - r randomly, P(r  I - s&o)  = P(r  I - s&  - o) = .5. In this con- 
text, P(o I r) = .45. A substantial error! The reason that we were led astray 
was the inappropriate belief that P(s )= .8 applied to the set of  states 
containing r. Instead, we needed P(s I r), of which we knew nothing. 
Unfortunately, this is a very general problem. To assign probabilities 
correctly after a restricted set of  possible states have been specified, one must 
assign probabilities that are conditioned on that set of states. That is, one must 
condition on the evidence items that led to that selection of states. But, i f  one 
can already make these assessments, then the enumeration of possible states 
was a redundant step. Although enumerating possible states may help a person 
"construct" a probability estimate, such an enumeration step cannot be useful 
in an automated system, where all available probability information is already 
explicitly encoded in a database. 2 
The results in the previous sections do not directly address this fundamental 
limit. They do, however, suggest a different perspectivc on combining sym- 
bolic and probabilistic reasoning. Namely, possible states reasoning can pro- 
vide useful and probabilistically interpretable information beyond that provided 
by a database of probability assessments. Indeed, conceivably there are do- 
mains where this additional information satisfies properties so compelling 
(viz., provable calibration) that it may warrant a policy of reporting of  belief 
values inconsistent with accepted probabilities. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the 
problem of reasoning under uncertainty, in particular, to better understand the 
relation between symbolic and quantitative approaches to uncertain inference. 
In this section we will discuss the implications of the results. 
The first implication is that one needs to proceed with extreme caution when 
forming a justification for an uncertainty calculus. Two criteria that often are 
used to evaluate a quantitative uncertain reasoning system are accuracy (global 
calibration) and usefulness (audaciousness). Even when not used directly, 
2 Note that his result does not apply to symbolic systems that are based on the epsilon-semantics 
(Pearl [1]). This is because an epsilon-semantics is not based on a possible states emantics. For 
example, in an epsilon-semantics onecan, by default, individually deduce both a and b, hut not 
a& b--even though in any possible state if both a and b are true, then a&b is also true. 
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performance evaluation metrics (e.g., Brier Score) usually reflect hese criteria 
implicitly. As we have seen in this paper, however, two functions (c and cp), 
which are obviously unreasonable asuncertainty calculi, rate surprisingly well 
on these two criteria. 3 Indeed, no other calculus can do better on both criteria 
simultaneously. This suggests that to justify an uncertainty calculus, one must 
specify and justify an explicit tradeoff between these two criteria. To my 
knowledge this has never been done. 
Alternatively, one could drop global calibration and focus on the accuracy of 
a selected subset of important propositions. This was called local calibration. 
When local rather than global calibration is used Theorems 1-3 are no longer 
valid. This suggests that an implicit justification for the using an uncertainty 
calculus is that certain propositions are deemed more interesting than others. 
To my knowledge this is the first time anyone has noted that how one values a 
proposition 4 impacts how one calculates a degree of belief in that proposition. 
The second implication has to do with the notion that one can combine 
symbolic and probabilistic reasoning schemes in a coherent way. If, semanti- 
cally, the symbolic system operates by selecting/rejecting possible states, then 
one cannot effectively combine state selection operations and probabilistic 
reasoning without sacrificing coherence. This is because the probabilistic 
reasoning will not be conditioned on the data that drove the state selection 
process. 
An alternative approach to combining symbolic and probabilistic reasoning 
is to exploit he unique properties of each. Possibility ratios may have little to 
do with "true" probabilities (if indeed such a thing exists), but by merging 
ratio information with calibrated probability information (such as is done with 
the cp function) one can at least provide outputs with useful and provable 
properties. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS 
In any propositional system, logically distinct propositions correspond 
uniquely to sets of possible worlds. In the proofs that follow PP will always 
refer to a propositional system. As convenient, any element p in PP may be 
referred to as a propositional sentence or a set of possible states. 
Theorems 1 and 2 are similar to theorems found in chapter 4 of Horwich 
[16]. The difference is that Horwich showed precise calibration for the set 
{q[ p, where c(q I p) = x} where Theorems 1 and 2 consider only the subset 
{q, where c(q) = x}. 
TH~.O~M 1 I f  the true state is a member of the set of possible states, 
then the belief values assigned by the c-function are precisely calibrated. 
3 For readers who have not seen it before, the c-function is not new. Philosophers, uch as Carnap 
[18] and Horwich [16] only present i as a straw man with obvious failings. 
4 Please note that this is not the same as assigning a value to an outcome. 
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Proof By deduction. Let PP have N possible states, and let n -< N be 
some nonnegative integer. One can construct all propositions, p, with c(p) = 
n/N by taking each subset of n states and forming a logical disjunction of 
these states. This gives us NI / (n l (N -  n)!) propositions with c-value n/N. 
Given any possible state s, one can construct exactly (N-  1)!/((n - 1)!(N 
- n)!) subsets of n states that contain s. Consequently, each possible state is 
consistent with exactly 
(N-  l ) ! / ( (n -  I ) ! (N -n) ! )  
(N) ! / (n ! (N-  n)!) = n /N  
of the propositions with c-value n/N.  Since the true state is one of the 
possible states, this property must hold for the true state. • 
THEOREM 2 A function that assigns rational-numbered belief values 
that are provably, precisely calibrated cannot be uniformly more auda- 
cious than the c-function. 
Proof By induction. Let the function bel assign provably, calibrated belief 
values to propositions in a propositional system. Assume bel(q) >_ 
c( q)[ bel( q) < c(q)] for all q where c(q) is less [greater] than or equal to .5. 
Since bel assigns rational values and is precisely calibrated, there must be 
some largest integer N, such that {O/N, l /N,  2IN, . . . .  N /N} is the range of 
bel. Define C(x ,y )  = {q lx<-N*c(q)<-Y}  and BEL(x ,y )  = {q lx -< 
N*bel(q) <_ y}. 
From the definition of bel, we know C(0, .5N) = BEL(O, .5N). 
Now the induction step. Assume BEL(O, n) = C(O, n) for some integer n 
where .5N _< n < N. Given this assumption, we show that BEL(O, n + 1) = 
C(0, n + 1). By the definition of bel, BEL(O, n + 1) must be a subset of 
C(0, n + 1). If it is a proper subset, then BEL(n + 1, n + 1) is a proper 
subset of C(n + 1, n + 1). However, from the proof of Theorem 1 we know 
that for each possible state C(n + 1, n + 1) contains exactly n + 1 proposi- 
tions true in that state. Remove any members of C(n + 1, n + 1) and there 
will be a possible state with fewer than n + 1 propositions in the resulting set. 
Since this possible state may the true state, precise calibration is not guaran- 
teed. Consequently, precise calibration is not a provable property. Conse- 
quently, in order for bel to satisfy provable, precise calibration, BEL(m, m) 
= C(m, m) for all .5N _ m _ N. A similar proof holds for integers less 
than .5N. • 
THEOREM 3 The c-function is the only function that assigns provably, 
precisely calibrated belief values that are coherent. 
Proof Assume n possible states. Let S = { s 1 . . . . .  sn} a set of propositions 
that correspond uniquely to the possible states. Let bel assign coherent 
point-values to propositions that are provably, precisely calibrated. 
We will show that for each member of S, bel(si) = c(si) = 1IN. 
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Since all members of S are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, coherence 
implies ~bel(si) = 1. Let x be the lowest value assigned by bel. If x < l /N ,  
then the set of propositions with bel-value x must be a proper subset of S. 
Call this set T, and let s k be a member of S - T. If s k represents he true 
state, then T cannot be a calibrated set. As a result, it is impossible to prove 
that T is precisely calibrated, which contradicts the assumption that bel is 
provably, precisely calibrated. Consequently, the lowest value assigned by bel 
is 1IN. From this and ~bel(s i) = 1, it follows that bel(si) = I /N,  for all s i. 
Since bel is coherent, we know that for any propositions p
bet(p)  = ~ be l (s i )= ~ c (s i )=  c (p) .  • 
pES i PESi 
THEOREM 4 Assume a set o f  rational-numbered belief values defined on 
a propositional system PP. The belief values are coherent Oef there exists an 
expanded propositional system, EPP, containing PP, such that bel(r l q ) 
= c(r ] q) for  all r and q in PP. 
Proof  Since c-values conform to probability calculus, only if portion is 
immediate. 
The if portion is proved by construction. Let r(s 0 . . .  r(sn) be the rational 
values assigned to the n states defined by PP. Let D be the largest common 
denominator and Ni/D = r(s~). EPP  is constructed as follows. First, add m 
propositions to PP,  where 2 m _> D. Second for each s~ find a sentence q~ 
where qi is true in exactly N~ of the states containing si. For each qi, add the 
axiom s i ~ qi. Now for each state si in PP  there are exactly N/ states in 
EPP that contain s t. So the possibility ratios in EPP  match the values 
assigned to each state in PP. • 
THEOREM 5 I f  a set o f  possible states contains the true state, and a set 
o f  probability statements assigns point probabilities to mutually exclusive 
propositions, then the corresponding cp-function assigns provably cali- 
brated values. 
Proof  Let T = { t 1 . . . . .  tm} be the set of mutually exclusive propositions 
for each of which a probability P(ti) has been specified. With no loss of 
generality, assume the t~'s partition the space of possible states. We will show 
that for any value x, the expected proportion of truths in the set Q = 
{q lcp(q)  = x} is x. 
Let q be any dement of Q, N~ the number of states containing ti, and n~ 
the number of states containing t~ and q. Define the set R 1 = {r Ifor all t i 
c(r l  t~) = n~/N~}. From the definition of cp, R 1 is a subset of Q. Further- 
more, by iteratively repeating this procedure one earl partition Q into subsets 
R 1 . . . . .  R k where r a, r~, in Rj  implies c(ral t i)  = c(r b I ti) for all t i in T. 
Consequently toprove that Q satisfies expected calibration, we need only show 
that each Ri satisfies expected calibration. We do this for R~ below. 
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A combinatorial nalysis, similar to the one found in the proof of Theorem 
1, reveals the following. The number of propositions in R 1 is exactly 
* . . .  * 
n l ! (N  1 - n l ) !  nm!(Nm - nm)!  " 
For any possible state, consistent with t~, the number of propositions in R~ 
consistent with that state is exactly 
(N , -  ° . Nm! 
,o ,  
(n, - 1)!(N, - n,)!  nm!(N  m - nm)! " 
From this it is straightforward to determine that in any state consistent with t~ 
the proportion of propositions in R 1 containing that state is exactly n l /N  l, and 
similarly, for any t r 
Consequently, the expected proportions of true propositions in R I is 
p( t l )n l /N  l + . . .  +P(tm)n m/Nm, which is the definition of cp(r). • 
THEOREM 6 I f  a set o f  possible states contain the true state, then there 
exist provably calibrated and coherent point-values consistent with a set o f  
probability statements PR, iff  there is a set o f  mutually exclusive proposi- 
tions fo r  which: (1) PR assigns point probabilities, and (2) the correspond- 
ing cp-values are consistent with PR.  
P roof  The if portion follows immediately from Theorem 5 and the require- 
ment for consistency with PR. 
To show the only if portion, we show that if a set of values satisfies provable 
calibration, then these values correspond to the cp-function. 
Let bel be a function that assigns coherent, provably calibrated point-val- 
ues. Since both bel and cp are coherent, we need only show that for any 
possible state, s, bel( s) = cp( s). 
Let { ri} be a set of propositions that (a) partition the possible states, (b) PR 
assigns point-values to each r i, and (c) PR does not assign unique point-values 
to any strict subsets of the possible states consistent with r;. Consistency with 
PR implies bel(ri) = P(ri). 
Let { s i~ , . . . ,  sire } be the possible states consistent with r i. We show below 
that these possible states all have the same bei value. 
Assume they do not have the same bel-value. Assume s o. has the lowest 
bel-value in this set. Let x = bel(sij), R x = {rl bel(r) = x}, and Sx = 
{s[ bel(s) = x & s ~ ri}. Assume S x contains m elements, then bel I(Sx) = 
rex. Since bel is provably calibrated, the expected proportion of truths in R x 
is x. From (c), however, in addition to P(Sx) = mx there must be some 
value y :~ mx for which P(Sx) = y is also consistent with PR. So holding 
P(R  x - Sx) fixed, the expected proportion of truths in Rx must be the same 
whether P(Sx) = mx or P(S~) = y ~ rex: a contradiction. 
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Since all members of { sit . . . . .  Sim } have the same bei value, it follows that 
bel(sij ) = (P(r i ) /m) = cp(sij ). A similar result holds for each possible state. 
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